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ABSTRACT 
Bell-LaPadula Model and Markov Chain Model are used for supply chain networks in the previous 
literature. However, Bell-LaPadula Model only considers the confidentiality aspect of security.  Markov 
Chain Model is used to simulate the dynamics of the security states.  In a typical supply chain network, 
the integrity of business transactions should be as important as confidentiality of those transactions.  The 
purpose of this paper is to apply Clark-Wilson model to the supply chain network integrity.  The major 
concepts of the Clark-Wilson model such as separation of duty, constrained data items, well-formed 
transactions, and transform procedures are applied to different situations of a supply chain network. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A supply chain is a sequence of processes that take place between customers, manufacturers/distributors and 
suppliers (Chopra & Meindl, 2006).  Narrow definition of supply chain network, or suppliers relationship 
management (SRM) is limited to the management of relationship between suppliers and manufacturers (or retail-
chain distributors).  The broader definition of a supply chain network includes all the parties from customers to 
suppliers.  Therefore, it further includes customer relationship management (CRM), warehousing, production, and 
product design.  Most textbooks use the broader definition for supply chain management. Today most large 
manufacturers such as General Motor or retail-chain distributors such as Wal-Mart are in the form of supply chain 
networks.   
 
One of the major goals of supply chain management is to minimize the total system costs from customers to 
suppliers so it can attract and retain customers in a competitive environment.  Another major goal of supply chain 
management is to achieve the efficiency of supply chain network so it can meet the philosophy of just-in-time 
manufacturing/delivery.  The efficiency of a supply chain network is relied on the success of the supply information 
network software system and IT infrastructure. A broader supply chain network system includes Enterprise 
Resources Planning (ERP) and Customer Relationship Management (CRM) systems.  The Intranet or extranet are 
examples for IT infrastructure for the supply chain network.  Another important issue of a supply chain network is 
the security of the information system.  In a supply chain network, most suppliers may have conflict of interests so 
the integrity and confidentially of the information is important in a supply chain network. 
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Chen et. al. (2006) proposed the application of Bell-LaPadula model in the design of a supply chain network. In the 
Bell-LaPadula model a subject has a security clearance and an object has a security classification. The goal of the 
Bell-LaPadula security model is to prevent “read” access to objects at a security classification higher than the 
subject’s clearance (Bishop, 2003).  However, the Bell-LaPadula Model only considers the confidentiality aspect of 
security.  In a typical supply chain network, the integrity of business transactions should be as important as 
confidentiality of those transactions. 
 
The Clark-Wilson model is one of the security models for information integrity for a business environment.  This 
paper attempts to model the security on a supply chain network using the Clark-Wilson Model by applying the 
major concepts such as separation of duty and transformation procedures (TP) in different supply chain situations. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Information Security 
 
The word “information” is defined as “Knowledge obtained from investigation, study, or instruction; Intelligence, 
News; Facts, Data” (Merriam-Webster Online, 2006). And the word “security” is defined as “measures taken to 
guard against espionage or sabotage, crime, attack, or escape”. Therefore, after combine these two definitions, 
information security can be defined as “measures, for which knowledge obtained from investigation, study, or 
instruction; intelligence, news taken to guard against espionage or sabotage, crime, attack, or escape”. More 
specifically, information security is defined in an NIST document as “protecting information and information 
systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide 
integrity, confidentiality and availability” (NIST, 2002).  In the same document “integrity” is defined as guarding 
against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and 
authenticity. The word “confidentiality” means preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, 
including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information. In addition, the word “availability” 
means ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. In other words, information security are 
“measures adopted to prevent the unauthorized use, misuse, modification, or denial of use of knowledge, facts, data, 
or capabilities” (Maiwaid, 2004). 
 
In the design of a secured supply network, there are many different models in providing policies for different aspects 
of the information security. For example, Bell-LaPadula Model has been used in military and is originally designed 
for modeling confidentiality in information security (Bishop, 2003). Bibba model uses subject and objectives 
theories from the Bell-LaPadula Model to provide security policy on data integrity. Bell-LaPadula model represents 
sensitivity levels of information in terms of a set of security clearances. The more sensitive the information is, the 
higher the security clearance is.  The security clearance of a subject can be in one of the levels: top security, 
security, confidential, and unclassified.  In the mean time, an object also has a security classification. A subject is 
only allowed to read the objects at a security levels not higher than the subject’s security clearance. Every subject 
must belong to a unique security clearance level. And every object must also belong to a unique classification level. 
For example, a CEO, who is in a “Top Security” security clearance, can read the personnel files. Whereas, a 
custodian, who is in a “unclassified” security clearance, can read the telephone lists. The CEO can also read the 
telephone lists; however, the custodian cannot read the personnel files.   In the following section, we review the 
applications of Bell-LaPadula Model in supply chain networks discussed in Chen et. al. (2006). 
 
The Bell-LaPadula Model for Supply Chain Networks 
 
Several papers discussed the information security in a supply chain network (Dynes, et. al., 2006).  Chen et. al. 
(2006) proposed to use the Bell-LaPadula model for a supply chain network.  Also mentioned by Shing et. al. 
(2006), the price offered by suppliers in a supply network should be confidential due to competition.  In fact, the 
confidentiality of most suppliers’ information is essential in today’s competitive business world. In order to design 
the security infrastructure in a supply chain network, Chen et. al. (2006) suggested the use of the Bell-LaPadula 
model.   
 
According to the Bell-LaPadula model, Chen et. al. (2006) classified the employees (subjects) in the buyer’s 
company into several security clearances and different documents (or objects) into some security classification 
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levels. For simplicity, assuming there are two security clearances for all employees in a buyer’s company. They are 
managers and employees. The managers can access (read) two documents: supplier evaluation and buying decision. 
On the other hand, employees can only access (read) two documents: public bidding notice and public retail price 
list. The managers can also access the documents which employees can access. However, employees cannot access 
the following documents: supplier evaluation and buying decision.  
 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between a purchasing company and their suppliers.  Parties involved include: 1) 
managers in the purchasing company, 2) employees in the purchasing company, and 3) different suppliers. Since a 
supplier and other suppliers may be in competition position, certain documents from this supplier to the purchasing 
company cannot be read by other suppliers.  Also, certain documents cannot be read by other employees in the 
purchasing company but these documents can be read by managers in the purchasing company.  Table 2 shows 
security classifications and clearance levels for a purchasing company and its suppliers (Chen et. al., 2006). 
 
Figure 1: A purchasing company and its suppliers. (Chen, et. al., 2006) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Security classification in a supply chain network. (Chen, et. al., 2006) 
Security Classification Purchasing Company 
Personnel and Their Suppliers 
Top Secret (TS) Managers in the purchasing 
company 
Secret (S) Other employees in the 
purchasing company 
Confidential (C) An individual supplier 
Unclassified (UC) All the suppliers 
 
The Markov Chain Model for Supply Chain Networks 
Shing et.al. (2006) proposed the use of the Markov Chain Model for a supply chain network.  Given a set of random 
variables {X(t), t≥ 0}  indexed by the time parameter t (all possible values of t form the parameter space T). The 
process X(t) is a stochastic process. The values X(t) are called states.  Consider time points t0 < t1 < t2 < …< tn < t. 
A Markov process is a stochastic process {X(t), t∈  T} if 
 
P[X(t)≤  x | X(tn)=xn , X(tn-1)=xn-1 , …, X(t0)=x0 ]=P[X(t) ≤  x | X(tn)=xn ] 
 
That is, a Markov process is a stochastic process that the probability of the process at a state depends only on the 
previous state, not on the previous history of getting to the previous state. If the states are discrete and the stochastic 
process has a discrete parameter space, then it is called a Markov chain {Xn, n=0, 1, 2, ...}. In other words, a 
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stochastic process {Xn} is a Markov chain if at any k time points n1 >n2>…>nk, there are k corresponding states i1, 
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where p
i
(0) represents the probability of the system is in state i at time 0. Then the probability that the system is in 
one of those m states at time 1 is represented by q(1), the state vector at time 1,  
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where p
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(1) represents the probability of the system is in state i at time 1.  And   
 
q(1)=Q q(0),         (3) 
 
where P is the one-step transition probability matrix,  
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for i=1,2,…,m, and p
ij
 is the probability of the system in the state j, given it was in the state i. The probability that 
the system is in one of those m states at time s is represented by q(s), the state vector at time s,  
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where p
i
(s) represents the probability of the system is in state i at time s. And  
 
q(s) = Q(Q(…(Q q(0))))=Q
s
 q(0),      (5)  
 
where Q is the transition probability matrix, By combining the subjects and objects possible security levels, we can 
list all possible states as states in the Markov chain model. After identify the starting state vector at time 0, q(0) in 
(1), and the one-step probability transition matrix Q in (4), the state vector at the next time 1, q(1) in (2) can be 
obtained straightforward by (3). The state vector at time s, q(s), can be directly calculated by (5). (Shing et.al., 
2006). 
 
CLARK-WILSON MODEL IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORK 
Purchasing is a key activity of the supply chain management.  In order to keep the cost down, a purchasing company 
tends to send out the request for quotation for a group of potential suppliers.  The purchasing company will choose a 
supplier with the best combination of price and quality.  Sometimes a potential supplier will try to collect the 
information about other suppliers so it can provide the best bid to the purchasing company.  Since most transactions 
involved will go through a computer-based network system such as Extranet or Internet, the data integrity and 
confidentiality becomes very important between suppliers and the purchasing company.  
 
Clark-Wilson Model is designed for a commercial environment (Bishop, 2003).  The Clark-Wilson model uses three 
important concepts: separation of duty, constrained data items, and well-formed transactions (Javvin Technologies, 
Inc.).  Separation of duty means that no single person should perform a task alone.  A task should be done by two or 
more people or monitored by another person to prevent the fraud.  The Clark-Wilson models divided all the data into 
two categories: Constrained Data Items (CDI) and Unconstrained Data Items (UDI).  Unconstrained data items do 
not need to be protected while constrained data items are protected by Integrity Verification Procedure (IVP).  Well-
formed transaction means that a user has to use the data under certain constrains and cannot change data as they 
want.  Blake (2000) used an example to explain how the Clark-Wilson model is applied to a typical purchasing 
process.  We make a slight revision to his example as follows: 
 
1. The production department needs a component and submits an acquisition request to the purchasing 
department and the accounting department. 
 
2. Purchasing department creates a purchase order for the component and sends copies to several suppliers, 
the receiving department, and the accounting department.  
 
3. Upon receiving the components, the production department checks the delivery and make sure that the 
quality and quantity meet the specifications, signs a goods receipt (the term used by SAP R/3 software).  Goods 
receipt goes to the accounting dept.  
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4. The supplier sends an invoice to the accounting department. Accounting department compares the 
invoice with the purchase order and the goods receipt.  If there is no problem, the accounting department issues an 
electronic payment or check to the supplier.  
 
The process is shown on Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Purchasing process in a supply chain networks.  
 
 
As mentioned by Blake, “… Data items are changed only by transformation procedures, thereby maintaining their 
integrity.” Because the separation of duty, a simple purchasing task is divided to:  production department, 
purchasing department, suppliers, and accounting department. The constrained data items are the purchase order, 
packing list, goods receipts, invoice and electronic payment (or check). “Each department may only invoke some 
transformation procedures, and a pre-specified set of data objects or CDIs” (Ge, et. al., 2004).  The transformation 
procedures (TP) are sending purchasing requisition, creating  purchase order, sending purchase order,  sending 
goods and goods receipt, signing goods receipt form, creating invoice, sending invoice, comparing invoice to order, 
and so on (Ge, et. al., 2004).   
 
Today most SCM systems such as SAP R/3 and SAP APO use a central database.  It means all the data and forms 
are actually stored in a physical database as Figure 3 (See next page).  
 
In such a case, possible security leaking loophole can happen.  For example,  
 
1. The clerk in the accounting department can access all the three documents: the purchasing order, the invoice, and 
the goods receipt.  In principal, he can read these documents but he cannot modify these documents except the 
electronic payment.  However, he is in the internal position and may be very familiar with other department’s 
conditions.  Normally, the production department only concerns about whether they receive the components.  A bad 
clerk can hack into the systems and revise all document in a small amount, (i.e. change from $1000.00 to $1050.00) 
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and send a payment $1000.00 to the supplier and sends $50.00 into a dummy account which eventually will go to 
his pocket.  In the above situation, the separate of duty and TP will make this kind of situations hard to happen.   
 
Figure 3: A computerized supply chain network system. 
 
2. Another supplier can hack into the computer systems and increases the amount in purchase order in the step 2 and 
the transaction may not happen in the step 3 because of misunderstanding. 
 
One of the most popular SCM software is SAP R/3.  Figure 4 shows the transformation procedure used by SAP.  
SAP uses “document principle” which means a transform process is associated with a physical document or 
electronic document. 
 
 Figure 4: Transformation procedures for purchasing in the SAP software.  
(Source: SAP handouts, 2003) 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In conclusion, the integrity for the supply chain networks can be modeled by Clark-Wilson model.  It is important 
for an SCM software package to incorporate the security features to the design the supply chain network.  One of the 
problems is the trade-off between the security features and user-friendliness of the software.  Transform procedure 
(TP) is good method to prevent possible fraud but it makes the computer systems more complex or bureaucrat.  
Future research may focus on the number of minimum TPs is needed for maintaining the integrity level. 
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